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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
Rupert Isaac appeals from a final judgment of sentence. 
We will reverse and remand for reconsideration of Isaac's 
motion to enforce the plea agreement he reached with the 
government. 
 
I 
 
Defendant Rupert Isaac was pulled over by the Virgin 
Islands police for a routine traffic violation. During the 
stop, the officers observed an empty holster in the side 
pocket of the vehicle door. After conducting a search of the 
vehicle, they found a box of live rounds of .357-caliber 
ammunition and a quantity of marijuana divided into a 
number of plastic "dime" bags. After arresting Isaac, the 
officers conducted an inventory search of his vehicle and 
located a loaded .357-caliber revolver underneath the 
driver's seat floor mat. 
 
Isaac was named in a two-count indictment charging him 
with (1) carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug 
trafficking crime, contrary to 18 U.S.C. S 924(c)(1); and (2) 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 841(a)(1). Shortly 
thereafter, Isaac pled guilty to both counts, pursuant to an 
agreement with the government, which included the 
following provisions: 
 
       1. The defendant agrees to cooperate fully and 
       truthfully with the government . . . . 
 
       . . . 
 
       4. If the Government in its sole discretion determines 
       that the defendant has fulfilled his obligations of 
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       cooperation as set forth above, at the time of 
       sentencing or within one (1) year thereof the 
       government will . . . 
 
       . . . 
 
       b. Make a motion to allow the Court to depart from 
       the Sentencing Guidelines pursuant to Sentencing 
       Guideline S 5K1.1, if the government, in its sole 
       discretion, determines that the defendant has 
       provided substantial assistance in the investigation 
       or prosecution of another person who has committed 
       an offense. 
 
App. at 24, 27. 
 
The government held a series of meetings with the 
defendant pursuant to the agreement. Ultimately, however, 
the government determined that it would not request a 
downward departure under U.S.S.G. S 5K1.1. 
 
When no motion was filed, Isaac moved for an order 
directing the government to file a S 5K1.1 motion or, 
alternatively, for an order allowing him to withdraw his 
guilty pleas. The motion asserted that the pleas were 
entered in reliance on the government's commitment to file 
a S 5K1.1 motion and that the government had failed to 
honor that commitment in "bad faith." App. at 89. Isaac's 
primary argument was that the plea agreement should be 
specifically enforced, but he pointed out that under 
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), the court 
could, in the alternative, grant him permission to withdraw 
his pleas. 
 
The government's response to this motion "readily 
concede[d] that defendant Isaac did meet with law 
enforcement officials on a few occasions in an attempt to 
fulfill his end of the bargain. However, [the response 
continued,] nothing he provided during these discussions 
could [be] verified or corroborated independently to date. 
Hence, his counsel was advised that the government [had] 
determined, in its sole discretion, that the defendant [had] 
not provided `substantial assistance.' " App. at 83. 
 
At the oral argument on Isaac's motion, his counsel 
candidly acknowledged that he had no reason to believe the 
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government's refusal to file a motion was based on race or 
other constitutionally suspect grounds. Rather, he relied on 
the plea agreement and a written supplemental agreement 
in which the government had specified the kind of 
information it sought from Isaac. Counsel represented to 
the court that Isaac had supplied the information that he 
had of the character sought, that the government had 
indicated it had some reason to believe the information 
might be truthful, but that it had declined to file a S 5K1.1 
motion solely because it could not independently 
corroborate that information. As counsel put his argument, 
"[t]he government just hasn't used its vast resources to 
verify what the defendant has said but that is not[a] 
sufficient" reason to justify not filing the motion. App. at 
56. 
 
In response, the government's primary position was that 
it had no duty to explain its decision not to file the motion 
because the court had no jurisdiction to review the exercise 
of "its sole discretion" under the agreement. The 
government did, however, confirm that Isaac had provided 
some information about criminal activity of others of the 
character specified in the supplemental agreement. It 
added, by way of explanation, that it had been unable to 
independently verify the information provided and further 
indicated that it believed Isaac had been selective in his 
disclosures. 
 
The district court denied the motion, determining that 
because the agreement gave the government "sole 
discretion" to decide whether a substantial assistance 
motion was warranted, the court had no power to review 
the government's refusal to file the motion. 
 
Isaac moved for reconsideration. In the motion and the 
course of the ensuing evidentiary hearing, Isaac advanced 
new grounds, independent of the plea agreement, in 
support of his application for permission to withdraw his 
pleas. He asserted that there was "no factual basis" for his 
pleas. App. at 107. With respect to the weapons count, he 
insisted that it was clear, based on the government's own 
evidence, that he had not used or carried the gun in 
relation to a drug offense. With respect to the possession 
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count, he alleged that the government's evidence did not 
demonstrate that the substance possessed was marijuana. 
 
After an evidentiary hearing at which the district court 
heard the government's evidence, the motion for 
reconsideration was denied. In its opinion, the court 
concluded that the government's evidence demonstrated 
that Isaac had carried a gun in relation to the drug offense 
of possession with intent to distribute. It pointed 
specifically to the large amount of marijuana found in the 
car, the presence of packaging and paraphernalia used in 
distributing marijuana, the fact that the gun was loaded 
and the fact that it was in a place readily accessible to 
Isaac as he drove. With respect to the second count, the 
court concluded that the substance discovered in Isaac's 
vehicle was marijuana, pointing to the testimony of Lt. 
Harvey. Harvey testified that he had field tested for 
marijuana and received positive results and that he had 
received a report from the DEA lab stating that the 
substance had tested positive for marijuana. 
 
The court then sentenced Isaac to the statutory 
mandatory minimum five years on Count I, a consecutive 
24 months for Count II, three years supervised release, a 
$1,000 fine, and a $100 special assessment. This appeal 
followed. 
 
II 
 
Isaac contends the district court erred in determining 
that it had no power to review the government's refusal to 
file a substantial assistance motion pursuant to the plea 
agreement. The district court characterized Isaac's motion 
as a request for the court to "review independently the 
quality of his assistance to determine whether it was indeed 
`substantial.' " App. at 95. The district court declined this 
invitation, choosing to rely upon the agreement's language 
that the government had "sole discretion" whether to make 
the S 5K1.1 motion. The question on appeal is whether this 
approach was erroneous. Our review of this question of law 
is plenary. See United States v. Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d 
1357, 1360 (3d Cir. 1989). 
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The sentencing guidelines provide that "[u]pon motion of 
the government stating that the defendant has provided 
substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of 
another person who has committed an offense, the court 
may depart from the guidelines." U.S.S.G. S 5K1.1. The 
language of S 5K1.1 requires that the government make a 
motion before a district court can depart from the 
sentencing guidelines range in recognition of a defendant's 
substantial assistance. Since S 5K1.1 expressly leaves 
discretion to the government, it is clear that, in the absence 
of a plea agreement, a district court has an extremely 
limited role in reviewing the government's refusal to move 
for a departure. 
 
In Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181 (1992), the 
Supreme Court outlined a narrow space for a defendant to 
challenge the government's refusal to file a S 5K1.1 motion 
in the absence of a plea agreement. Wade voluntarily 
provided the government with information used to secure a 
conviction of another person, and then sought to require 
the government to file a S 5K1.1 motion. The Court 
determined that the prosecutor's discretion to file the 
motion was almost unfettered: the government's refusal 
could only be challenged if it "was based on an 
unconstitutional motive," like race or religion. 504 U.S. at 
185-86. "It follows that a claim that a defendant merely 
provided substantial assistance will not entitle a defendant 
to a remedy or even to discovery or an evidentiary hearing." 
Id. at 186. Thus, where the defendant has not entered a 
plea agreement, it is clear that the prosecutor has almost 
unreviewable discretion over whether to file a substantial 
assistance motion. 
 
However, it is equally clear that when a defendant has 
entered into a plea agreement expressly requiring the 
government to make a S 5K1.1 motion, a district court has 
broad powers to enforce the terms of the plea contract. In 
Santobello v. United States, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), the 
Supreme Court held that a plea agreement reached with 
the government is enforceable against the government. 
Santobello was initially charged with two gambling 
violations. He agreed to enter a guilty plea to one offense in 
return for the prosecutor's promise not to recommend a 
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specific sentence before the judge. However, at sentencing 
the prosecutor nonetheless recommended the maximum 
prison term allowed for the offense. In these circumstances, 
the Court had little difficulty vacating the sentence since 
Santobello had expressly " `bargained' . . . for a particular 
plea . . . on [the] condition that no sentence 
recommendation would be made by the prosecutor." 404 
U.S. at 262. Thus, the Court held that "when a plea rests 
in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the 
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the 
inducement or consideration, such promise must be 
fulfilled." Id. 
 
This court has reasoned from Santobello to the general 
proposition that "[a]lthough a plea agreement occurs in a 
criminal context, it remains contractual in nature and is to 
be analyzed under contract-law principles." United States v. 
Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d 1357, 1361 (3d Cir. 1989). Thus, 
"once the government makes an agreement with a 
defendant to file a [S 5K1.1] motion, it is bound by the 
terms of the agreement. It is a simple matter of contract 
law." United States v. Carrara, 49 F.3d 105, 107 (3d Cir. 
1995).1 The scope of review given a prosecutor's refusal to 
make a substantial assistance motion under S 5K1.1 is 
thus dependant upon the existence of a contractual 
relationship between the defendant and the government. In 
the absence of a plea agreement, review is allowed only for 
an unconstitutional motivation. If the plea agreement 
contemplates a motion, however, the district court is free to 
apply contract principles to determine whether the 
agreement has been satisfied. 
 
In this case, Isaac reached a plea agreement with the 
government that does not expressly promise that the 
government will file a S 5K1.1 motion; rather, the 
government has retained "sole discretion" whether to make 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Court in Wade did not reach the question of the effect of a plea 
agreement on the prosecutor's discretion to file a substantial assistance 
motion. Indeed, the Court refused to upset prior precedent in this area, 
specifically noting that an "agreement on the Government's behalf to file 
a substantial-assistance motion" was not at issue. 504 U.S. at 185 
(citing Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262-63). 
 
                                7 
  
the motion. The question this case presents is whether the 
district court can review a prosecutor's refusal to make the 
motion under such restrictive terms. The district court 
decided that though "Wade did not involve a plea 
agreement, its holding nonetheless applies" to these facts. 
App. at 97. The district court distinguished the contract 
analysis typically used to construe a plea agreement by 
reference to the discretion afforded the government in the 
agreement. Since Isaac agreed to leave the government with 
"sole discretion" whether or not to make theS 5K1.1 
motion, the district court found this case closer to Wade 
than to Santobello. See App. at 97-100; see also United 
States v. Forney, 9 F.3d 1492, 1501-02 (11th Cir. 1993) 
(holding Wade controls on similar facts). 
 
We conclude that this was error. A close reading of Wade 
indicates that its teachings are confined to situations in 
which there is no plea agreement. Given the general rule 
that plea agreements are contractual in nature, district 
courts must be able to review the parties' performance 
under the terms of such an agreement. Our recent decision 
in United States v. Roman, 121 F.3d 136, 142-143 (3d Cir. 
1997), illustrates this principle. At issue in Roman was 
whether the defendant had provided information sufficiently 
"complete" to trigger the government's promise to file a 
S 5K1.1 motion. The district court had reviewed the terms 
of the plea agreement and evaluated the cooperation the 
defendant provided, concluding that the government 
correctly refused to make the substantial assistance motion 
under the circumstances. We treated the issue of 
compliance with the plea agreement as a straight forward 
matter of contract law and affirmed the district court. See 
121 F.3d at 142-43. 
 
Two other circuits considering whether to enforce a plea 
agreement that reserves to the government "sole discretion" 
have similarly applied contract principles. While recognizing 
the wide discretion afforded the prosecutor by the language 
of the plea agreement, these cases have nevertheless 
required district courts to make certain the prosecutor 
exercises "good faith" in carrying out her obligations under 
the contract. In United States v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710 (2d 
Cir. 1990), like the case before us, the Second Circuit 
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reviewed "a cooperation agreement [that] provide[d] for a 
motion for downward departure on condition the defendant 
provide substantial assistance to be determined in the 
discretion of the prosecutor." Id. at 714. The court applied 
the contract principle that "where the agreement is 
conditioned on satisfaction of the obligor, the condition is 
not met `if the obligor is honestly, even though 
unreasonably, dissatisfied.' " Id. at 713 (quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts S 228, Comment a). The 
court reasoned from this principle that a prosecutor's 
discretion under such a plea agreement, though broad, is 
"not completely unlimited." Id. at 714. The court concluded 
that a district court's review of the government's refusal to 
file the S 5K1.1 motion under such an agreement "is limited 
to deciding whether the prosecutor has made its 
determination in good faith." Id. Thus, the government's 
reservation of discretion in the plea agreement merely limits 
and does not strip the district court of power to review the 
government's performance under the agreement. The Tenth 
Circuit has since adopted the Rexach analysis. See, e.g., 
United States v. Lee, 989 F.2d 377, 380 (10th Cir. 1993); 
United States v. Vargas, 925 F.2d 1260, 1266 (10th Cir. 
1991).2 
 
The district court here relied upon the Eleventh Circuit's 
opinion in Forney to reject the analysis of Rexach. Forney, 
as well as the district court, reasoned that Rexach was 
flawed because it does not survive the Supreme Court's 
decision in Wade. See 9 F.3d at 1499 n. 2.3 We disagree. As 
we suggested above, Wade did not involve a plea 
agreement, and the Court specifically excluded 
consideration of a plea agreement in rendering its opinion. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Tenth Circuit's recent decision in United States v. Courtois, 131 
F.3d 937 (1997), cited in the dissent, contains language seemingly to the 
contrary. However, Courtois did not involve an allegation of bad faith and 
did nothing to impugn the earlier decisions in Lee and Vargas. 
 
3. Forney more generally suggested that courts have refused to follow a 
contract analysis post-Wade. See 9 F.3d at 1501 n. 4. However, both the 
Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Knights, 968 F.2d 1483 (2d 
Cir. 1992), and the Tenth Circuit's decision in United States v. Lee, 989 
F.2d 377, 380 (10th Cir. 1993), were decided post-Wade and fully 
adopted the Rexach analysis. 
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See 504 U.S. at 185. To apply Wade in this case would 
reject settled Third Circuit precedent that construes plea 
agreements according to traditional contract principles. 
Accordingly, we find more persuasive the analysis of the 
Second Circuit in Rexach that a district court is empowered 
to examine for "good faith" a prosecutor's refusal to file a 
S 5K1.1 motion pursuant to a plea agreement that gives the 
prosecutor "sole discretion" to determine whether the 
defendant's assistance was substantial.4  
 
As we have explained, the difference between the 
situation now before us and that in Wade is that the 
defendant here has bargained away important rights. When 
a defendant pleads guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, he 
gives up his rights to a fair trial, confrontation, and a 
potential acquittal by a jury; the government, in return, 
secures its conviction without effort or risk. When the 
agreement contains a S 5K1.1 provision like the one 
involved here, it is not the case that the clause regarding 
government discretion deprives the defendant of any 
reasonable expectation of receiving something in return for 
the surrender of his rights. Isaac did not strike an illusory 
bargain. He, as would anyone else in the same position, 
had a reasonable expectation that there would be a 
discretionary evaluation of his cooperation in good faith. As 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The dissent, post at p. 18-19, suggests that the "overwhelming 
majority" of other circuits to decide this issue have determined that 
Wade applies in the context of a plea agreement that gives the 
prosecution "sole discretion" to determine whether to file a S 5K1.1 
motion. However, most of the cases cited by the dissent do not involve 
an allegation of bad faith on the part of the prosecution, nor do they 
apply contract principles in construing the plea agreement at issue. See 
United States v. Price, 95 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 1996) (no discussion of bad 
faith or contract principles); United States v. Romsey, 975 F.2d 556 (8th 
Cir. 1992) (same); United States v. Raynor, 939 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1991) 
(same); United States v. Mote, 1996 WL 528437 (9th Cir. Sept. 19, 1996) 
(unpublished opinion) (no discussion of bad faith). Only the Eleventh 
Circuit in Forney and, arguably, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. 
Burrell, 963 F.2d 976, 984-85 (7th Cir. 1992), and the Fifth Circuit in 
United States v. Aderholt, 87 F.3d 740, 742-43 (5th Cir. 1996), have 
come close to addressing the precise issue decided in this case. 
Comparing the analysis in those cases to that of the Second and Tenth 
Circuits, we find the latter more persuasive. 
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a result, this is not a situation where nothing "is 
reasonably due [him] in the circumstances." Santobello, 404 
U.S. at 262. 
 
Nor is it the case that Isaac's reasonable expectation 
cannot be honored, and the government held to its bargain, 
without taking the courts into foreign territory and 
undermining the Congressional intent behind S 5K1.1. 
Good faith is not a concept novel to the courts. Since 
"[e]very contract imposes upon each party a duty of good 
faith and fair dealing in its performance," Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts S 205, determining whether an 
allegation of bad faith has been established is a common 
occurrence in the enforcement of contracts. All that our 
decision requires of the district courts is that they apply 
settled principles of contract law to a particular type of 
contract. Nor does our decision require a district court to 
interfere with the prosecutorial discretion that we believe 
Congress intended United States Attorneys to exercise. The 
sole requirement is that the government's position be based 
on an honest evaluation of the assistance provided and not 
on considerations extraneous to that assistance.5 
 
We thus hold that a district court has jurisdiction to 
determine whether the government's refusal to file a 
S 5K1.1 motion in circumstances such as these is 
attributable to bad faith and, accordingly, in violation of the 
plea agreement. By so holding we do not suggest that an 
evidentiary hearing must be held every time a defendant 
challenges the prosecutor's exercise of discretion. Rather, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The dissent, post at p. 18, contends that "Isaac could not have 
reasonably believed that the government would automatically file a 
S 5K1.1 motion if he cooperated." This argument misses the point. The 
issue is not whether the government agreed to automatically file a 
S 5K1.1 motion upon cooperation; rather, the issue is whether Isaac 
could reasonably believe that under the plea contract, the government 
would evaluate his cooperation in good faith. It seems to us that the 
analysis of the dissent leads inescapably to the conclusion that a 
defendant who secures a S 5K1.1 commitment from the government like 
the one involved here stands in exactly the same position after he 
extracts his bargain from the government as he did before. That analysis 
thus renders superfluous the provision of the plea contract concerning 
the filing of a S 5K1.1 motion. 
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we agree with the approach that is taken in the Second 
Circuit as articulated in United States v. Imtiaz, 81 F.3d 
262, 264 (2d Cir. 1996): 
 
       [T]o trigger judicial review of the prosecutor's decision, 
       the defendant "must first allege that he . . . believes the 
       government is acting in bad faith." United States v. 
       Khan, 920 F.2d 1100, 1106 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 
       499 U.S. 969, 111 S.Ct. 1606, 113 L.Ed.2d 669 (1991). 
       The government "may rebut this allegation by 
       explaining its reasons for refusing to depart." Knights, 
       968 F.2d at 1487. If the government explains its 
       reasons, the defendant must "make a showing of bad 
       faith to trigger some form of hearing on that issue." Id. 
       (internal quotation marks omitted). Unless the 
       government's reasons are wholly insufficient, id. at 
       1487-89, or unless the defendant's version of events, 
       supported by at least some evidence, contradicts the 
       government's explanation, see United States v. 
       Leonard, 50 F.3d 1152, 1157-58 (2d Cir. 1995), no 
       hearing is required. 
 
In this case, Isaac alleged in his original motion that the 
government acted in bad faith when it decided not to file a 
S 5K1.1 motion. The district court did not specifically call 
upon the government to explain its refusal to file a motion 
because it ultimately concluded that it had no jurisdiction 
to review the government's decision. Before us, the 
government has urged only that the district court was 
correct in its view of the law and that the government has 
no duty to tender an explanation. While the record contains 
some explanatory comments from the prosecutor during 
oral argument on Isaac's motion, we conclude that the 
government should have the opportunity to formally state 
its explanation. On remand, the district court will call upon 
the government to explicate its reasoning and, assuming 
that a facially plausible reason is advanced, will provide 
Isaac with an opportunity to produce evidence giving 
reason to question the justification advanced. Only if Isaac 
comes forward with such evidence will the district court be 
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required to hold a hearing and make a finding as to 
whether the government has acted in good faith. 6 
 
III 
 
Isaac raised new grounds in his motion for 
reconsideration in support of his contention that he should 
be permitted to withdraw his guilty pleas. The district court 
considered those grounds on their merits despite Isaac's 
tardiness in raising them and for that reason, we will not 
regard them as procedurally barred. If the district court 
resolves on remand that there has been no breach of the 
plea agreement by the government, it will still have these 
alternative grounds before it. Since the district court has 
already expressed its view regarding their merit, and since 
we perceive no point in waiting until an appeal from their 
second rejection, we now proceed to pass on the propriety 
of the district court's disposition of Isaac's alternative 
arguments. 
 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(e) provides that "[i]f a motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty . . . is made before sentence is 
imposed, the court may permit the plea to be withdrawn if 
the defendant shows any fair and just reason." It is the 
defendant's burden to demonstrate a "fair and just reason" 
for withdrawing his or her guilty plea. Government of the 
Virgin Islands v. Berry, 631 F.2d 214, 220 (3d Cir. 1980). 
Since the rule leaves discretion to the district court, we 
have determined that "there is no absolute right to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Presumably based on the prosecutor's comments at oral argument, 
the district court's opinion observes that the government decided not to 
file a S 5K1.1 motion "because the information defendant provided could 
not be independently verified or corroborated." It did not have occasion 
to address whether this alone would support a finding that the 
government acted in good faith. We express no opinion on that issue, but 
it may be necessary for the district court to do so on remand. If, for 
example, it turns out that this is an accurate characterization of the 
government's reasoning and Isaac is able to show that he provided full, 
detailed and complete information about the commission of a crime by 
another which the government acknowledged that it believed to be true, 
the district court would have to decide whether a refusal to file based 
solely on the government's inability to independently corroborate Isaac's 
information constitutes a good faith refusal. 
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withdraw a guilty plea" and that a decision not to grant 
such a motion "will only be disturbed if the court has 
abused its discretion." Id. at 219-20; see also United States 
v. Huff, 873 F.2d 709, 712 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
With respect to the weapons count, Isaac asserted only 
that there was no factual basis to support his plea. The 
district court correctly determined that this is not the case. 
There is ample evidence to support a finding of guilt on this 
count. See United States v. Eyer, 113 F.3d 470, 475-76 (3d 
Cir. 1997). While it may be argued that the government's 
evidence does not require a finding that he carried a 
firearm in relation to a drug offense, that is clearly not 
alone enough to warrant withdrawal of a guilty plea that 
was knowingly and voluntarily entered. Once a defendant 
has entered a voluntary and informed plea, the fact that he 
changes his mind about his chances at trial is simply not 
enough to justify relieving him of the consequences of his 
solemn admission. See United States v. Jones, 979 F.2d 
317, 318 (3d Cir. 1992); Everett v. United States, 336 F.2d 
979, 982-83 (D.C. Cir. 1964).7 
 
With respect to the possession with intent to distribute 
count, Isaac asserted only that there was no factual basis 
to support his plea because the government's evidence did 
not establish the substance in his vehicle to be marijuana. 
The district court correctly determined that there was a 
factual basis for believing that substance to be marijuana. 
Again, we perceive no "fair and just" reason for permitting 
Isaac to withdraw his plea. 
 
IV 
 
The judgment of the district court will be reversed and 
the case will be remanded to the district court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We note that Isaac asserts no other "fair and just" reason that would 
justify permission to withdraw his plea. The record contains no affidavit, 
for example, averring that his decision not to plead guilty to Count I was 
made in reliance on a state of the controlling law that changed between 
the time of his plea and the time of his motion to withdraw. 
 
                                14 
  
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
In this appeal we are asked to determine the extent to 
which a district court may review the government's decision 
to refrain from filing a 5K1.1 motion where the government 
has entered into a plea agreement which preserves its 
discretion to determine whether such a motion is 
appropriate. While I agree with the majority that Santobello 
v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), provides the analytical 
framework we must initially apply in evaluating the terms 
of a plea agreement, I disagree with the majority's 
conclusion that where a plea agreement grants a prosecutor 
sole discretion to determine whether a defendant's 
assistance was substantial, the court must nevertheless 
evaluate the prosecutor's exercise of that discretion to 
determine if the prosecutor made his decision in good faith. 
In addition, I do not subscribe to the majority's adoption of 
the Second Circuit's approach for determining when a 
hearing in necessary to assess the government's good faith. 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
 
I. 
 
In our criminal justice system, we have historically 
entrusted the government with broad discretion to make 
prosecutorial decisions. Consequently, we have generally 
limited our review of this discretion to decisions based on 
an unconstitutional motive. Wade v. United States, 504 
U.S. 181 (1992); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 
(1985). We have restricted our review because the 
appropriate exercise of prosecutorial discretion is 
particularly ill-suited to judicial review; prosecutorial 
decisions generally are not readily susceptible to the kind of 
analysis courts are competent to undertake. Wayte, 470 
U.S. at 607. Moreover, extensive judicial supervision of 
prosecutorial discretion might prove detrimental to the 
criminal justice system; review subjects the prosecutor's 
motives and decisionmaking to outside inquiry thereby 
chilling law enforcement and undermines prosecutorial 
effectiveness by revealing the government's enforcement 
policy. Id. 
 
Congress has deemed it appropriate to confer 
prosecutorial discretion upon the government for the 
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purposes of recommending a departure from sentencing 
guidelines due to a defendant's substantial assistance. See 
18 U.S.C. S 3553(e)(1994); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
Manual (U.S.S.G.) S 5K1.1 (1997). Under section 5K1.1, a 
district court may award a downward departure from an 
otherwise mandatory sentencing range only if the 
government files a motion stating that the defendant has 
provided substantial assistance in investigating or 
prosecuting another person. U.S.S.G. S 5K1.1. This section 
gives the government the power, but not the duty, tofile a 
motion when the defendant has substantially assisted, 
thereby leaving the decision of whether to file a substantial 
assistance motion in the sole discretion of the government. 
Wade, 504 U.S. at 185. A prosecutor's refusal tofile a 
5K1.1 motion is evaluated like all other prosecutorial 
decisions; it is subject to judicial review only where the 
defendant can make a substantial showing of an 
unconstitutional motive. Id. at 185-86. 
 
A. 
 
The Wade mandate restricting judicial review of a 
prosecutor's refusal to file a 5K1.1. motion does not apply, 
however, where a prosecutor has specifically bargained 
away his discretion by entering into a plea agreement which 
obligates the government to file a 5K1.1 motion. Wade did 
not involve a plea agreement. In fact, citing Santobello v. 
New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262-63 (1971) and United States 
v. Conner, 930 F.2d 1073, 1075-77 (4th Cir. 1991), the 
Court specifically noted that the defendant in Wade did not 
claim that the government's discretion to file a 5K1.1 
motion was superseded by an agreement. Wade, 504 U.S. 
at 185. Implicit in Wade, therefore, is the proposition that 
a court may review a prosecutor's decision not tofile a 
5K1.1 motion for more than just unconstitutional motive if 
the prosecutor has entered into a plea agreement which 
specifically limits his otherwise broad discretion to file a 
substantial assistance motion. 
 
The Court's references to Santobello and Conner are 
instructive on this point. In Santobello, the Court held that 
"when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or 
agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be 
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part of the inducement or consideration, such promise 
must be fulfilled." Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262. In Conner, 
our sister court of appeals, for the Fourth Circuit, applied 
the holding of Santobello to a plea agreement in which the 
government promised to file a 5K1.1 motion in return for 
the defendant's substantial assistance. Conner, 930 F.2d at 
1076-77. The court held that "once the government uses its 
S 5K1.1 discretion as a bargaining chip in the plea 
negotiation process, that discretion is circumscribed by the 
terms of the agreement." Id. at 1075. 
 
After Conners, courts have consistently held that a 
prosecutor's plea agreement promise to file a 5K1.1 motion 
in exchange for a defendant's substantial assistance is 
subject to judicial review. See, e.g., United States v. Roman, 
121 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 722 
(1998); United States v. Dixon, 998 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 
1993). It is therefore clear that when a prosecutor enters 
into a plea agreement which diminishes his discretion to 
determine whether the defendant has rendered substantial 
assistance, courts may review a prosecutor's decision not to 
file a 5K1.1 motion to determine if the defendant's 
assistance was substantial and if the prosecutor acted in 
good faith in failing to file the motion. 
 
B. 
 
The more interesting question presented by this appeal, 
however, is whether a district court may review the 
government's decision to refrain from filing a 5K1.1 motion 
when the plea agreement provides that the government 
retains sole discretion to determine whether the motion is 
appropriate. 
 
To answer this question, we must start with the 
approach to analyzing plea agreements annunciated in 
Santobello. Under Santobello, we must determine whether 
the prosecutor has made a promise to file a 5K1.1 motion 
which induced the defendant to enter into the plea 
agreement. As noted by the majority, the plea agreement 
here provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
 
       1. The defendant agrees to cooperate fully and 
       truthfully with the government . . . . 
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       4. If the Government in its sole discretion determines 
       that the defendant has fulfilled his obligations of 
       cooperation as set forth above, at the time of 
       sentencing or within one (1) year thereof the 
       government will . . . 
 
       b. Make a motion to allow the Court to depart from 
       the Sentencing Guidelines pursuant to Sentencing 
       Guideline S 5K1.1, if the government, it in its sole 
       discretion, determines that the defendant has 
       provided substantial assistance in the investigation 
       or prosecution of another person who has committed 
       an offense . . . . 
 
App. at 24, 27. Given that the plea agreement clearly states 
that a 5K1.1 motion will only be filed if the government, in 
its sole discretion, determines that Isaac has provided 
substantial assistance, Isaac could not have reasonably 
believed that the government would automatically file a 
5K1.1 motion if he cooperated. Accordingly, under 
Santobello, the government has not made a promise to file 
a 5K1.1 motion which reasonably induced Isaac to enter 
the plea agreement. 
 
In the absence of a promise by the prosecutor tofile a 
5K1.1 motion which induced Isaac to enter the plea 
agreement, the principles set forth in Santobello are 
inapposite. We are therefore left with the same 
prosecutorial discretion that was at issue in Wade; 
discretion that has not been limited by a plea agreement. In 
this situation, Wade inescapably governs the extent of our 
review. Accordingly, because Isaac concedes that there is 
no reason to believe that the government's refusal to file a 
5K1.1 motion was based on constitutionally suspect 
grounds, the district court correctly refused to review that 
decision pursuant to Wade. 
 
The overwhelming majority of our sister courts that have 
decided this issue have reached this conclusion. See, e.g., 
United States v. Courtois, 131 F.3d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 
1997)(holding that where plea agreement states that the 
discretion to file a downward departure motion rests with 
the government, the government does not obligate itself to 
file a 5K1.1 motion and the court reviews only for 
 
                                18 
  
unconstitutional motive); United States v. Mote, 97 F.3d 
1462, 1996 WL 528437 (9th Cir. September 19, 
1996)(unpublished opinion)(holding that government does 
not breach plea agreement by refusing to file 5K1.1 motion 
where agreement states that the government alone will 
determine whether to file the motion); United States v. Price, 
95 F.3d 364, 368 (5th Cir. 1996)(stating "where the plea 
agreement expressly states that the government retains 
`sole discretion' over the decision as to whether or not to 
submit a motion, we have held that a refusal to do so is 
reviewable only for unconstitutional motive."); United States 
v. Forney, 9 F.3d 1492 (11th Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Romsey, 975 F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1992)(holding that where 
plea agreement preserves prosecutorial discretion tofile 
5K1.1 motion, court will only review for unconstitutional 
motive); United States v. Burrell, 963 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 
1992); United States v. Raynor, 939 F.2d 191, 195 (4th Cir. 
1991)(holding that where plea agreement did not promise a 
5K1.1 motion, court correctly refused to inquire into 
government's reasons for not filing the motion ).1 
 
In United States v. Burrell, 963 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1992), 
for example, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
rejected the defendant's argument that the government had 
breached its plea agreement by refusing to file a 5K1.1 
motion where the plea agreement granted the government 
sole discretion to file the motion. The court reasoned that 
because the agreement did not require the government to 
move for a departure in exchange for the defendant's guilty 
plea, there was no breach of the agreement. Id. at 985. The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. I disagree with the majority's characterization of Mote, Price, Romsey, 
and Raynor. These cases do apply contract principles in construing the 
plea agreements at issue. See, e.g., Mote, 1996 WL 528437 at *1 (stating 
"[a] plea agreement is contractual in nature and is subject to contract 
law standards"); Price, 95 F.3d at 368 (stating that issue turns on 
"specific language of the plea agreement at issue"); Romsey, 975 F.2d at 
558 (basing decision on "carefully-worded plea agreement"); Raynor, 939 
F.2d at 195 (holding that government did not promise to file a 5K1.1 
motion under terms of plea agreement). In addition, each of these cases 
holds that where the government has entered into a plea agreement 
which preserves its discretion to file a 5K1.1 motion, the courts may only 
review for unconstitutional motive. Under this rule, allegations of 
prosecutorial bad faith are irrelevant. 
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court further determined that because the defendant had 
not asserted that the government's refusal was based on an 
unconstitutional motive, the government's refusal to move 
for a departure was within its prosecutorial discretion. Id. 
 
Similarly, in United States v. Forney, 9 F.3d 1492, 1501- 
02 (11th Cir. 1993), the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit applied the Wade standard to a prosecutor's 
decision not to file a 5K1.1 motion where the plea 
agreement preserved the government's prosecutorial 
discretion. The plea agreement at issue in Forney required 
only that the government consider filing a 5K1.1 motion. 
The court reasoned that because there was no evidence 
that the government did not consider filing the motion, 
which is all it promised to do, the government had not 
failed to comply with the explicit provisions of the plea 
agreement. Forney, 9 F.3d at 1500 n.2. The court 
concluded that the contract analysis suggested by 
Santobello therefore was not implicated. Id. 
 
C. 
 
The majority's holding that when a plea agreement is 
involved courts must review a prosecutor's failure to file a 
5K1.1 motion for good faith even if the plea agreement 
reserves the prosecutor's discretion to make the motion 
fails to adhere faithfully to Wayte, Santobello and Wade 
and, moreover, undermines the policies underlying those 
decisions. 
 
I believe the majority's position contravenes the basic 
policies the Court outlined in Wayte. Wayte teaches that 
judicial review is inappropriate for prosecutorial decisions 
that are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis 
courts are competent to undertake. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607. 
Because a prosecutor can legitimately exercise his 
discretion to not file a substantial assistance motion for a 
variety of reasons which are unrelated to the amount of 
assistance the defendant has provided, where a plea 
agreement specifically preserves that discretion, courts are 
not competent to review the decision not to file. See 
generally, Wade, 504 U.S. at 187 (noting that the 
government may choose not to move "simply on its rational 
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assessment of the cost and benefit that wouldflow from 
moving"). Wayte further emphasizes that review of 
prosecutorial discretion detrimentally affects the 
administration of justice. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607. Where a 
plea agreement specifically preserves prosecutorial 
discretion, judicial scrutiny of the prosecutor's decision not 
to file a substantial assistance motion chills the 
government's ability effectively to obtain a defendant's 
cooperation by undermining the government's policy on 
what assistance should be deemed to be substantial. 
 
The majority's position also contravenes Santobello. The 
Court explained in Santobello that plea agreements are an 
essential and highly desirable component of the 
administration of justice and are to be encouraged when 
properly obtained. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260-61. As long 
as the defendant has been properly apprised of the terms of 
the agreement and voluntarily enters the plea agreement, 
the plea agreement must be enforced. Santobello requires 
only that the defendant receive "what is reasonably due in 
the circumstances." Id. at 262. Where, as here, a plea 
agreement provides that the prosecutor retains sole 
discretion to file a substantial assistance motion, the 
defendant cannot sensibly contend that he did not receive 
what he was reasonably due when the prosecutor exercises 
the discretion he has retained by not filing the motion. The 
majority's contrary position is inconsistent with the basic 
premise of Santobello that a plea bargain, like any contract, 
should be interpreted in accordance with the reasonable 
expectations of the parties.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The majority's analysis disregards the government's reasonable 
expectations in entering into the plea agreement with Isaac. As noted by 
the court in Forney: 
 
       [T]he government drafts a plea agreement requiring cooperation from 
       a defendant so that it will not be obligated to make a 5K1.1 motion 
       unless the assistance, which may have been misrepresented by the 
       defendant prior to entering the plea agreement or for the purpose 
of 
       obtaining a plea agreement, is useful. 
 
Forney, 9 F.3d at 1503 n.4. The government's expectation that the 
unambiguous sole discretion language in Isaac's plea agreement would 
accomplish this goal is inherently reasonable and should be afforded due 
consideration. 
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In light of the policy concerns underlying Wayte  and 
Wade and the fact that, under Santobello, the plea 
agreement here does not abrogate but rather preserves the 
extent of prosecutorial discretion at issue in Wade, I must 
dissent. While Wade may not apply to a case where a 
prosecutor has bargained away his discretion, this is not 
such a case. 
 
Furthermore, the majority's position fails to take into 
account that Congress has specifically set forth a statutory 
scheme which places the broad discretion to determine 
whether a defendant's assistance is substantial in the 
hands of prosecutors, not judges.3 Absent a plea agreement 
in which the government specifically bargains away this 
broad discretion, the courts must not interfere with the 
system Congress established. As aptly noted by one court, 
"[a]ny change in governmental discretion relating to 5K1.1 
motions stated in these statutes must come from Congress 
or the Sentencing Commission, and not from the courts." 
Forney, 9 F.3d at 1502 n.4. 
 
II. 
 
I also disagree with the majority's adoption of the Second 
Circuit's test in United States v. Imtiaz, 81 F.3d 262 (2d Cir. 
1996) which sets forth the burdens of production that 
would trigger judicial review. Under Imtiaz, a defendant's 
mere allegation that the government acted in bad faith is 
sufficient to trigger the government's obligation to explain 
its reasoning for refusing to depart. Imtiaz, 81 F.3d at 264. 
Based on the previously articulated policy concerns relating 
to prosecutorial discretion, at a minimum the defendant 
should be required to produce some evidence that the 
government has acted in bad faith before the government 
should be required to state its reasons for refusing to file a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. As several courts have recognized, the government is not only in the 
best position to determine whether the defendant has provided 
substantial assistance but also has a very strong incentive to exercise 
its 
discretion fairly in order to encourage future cooperation. Forney, 9 F.3d 
at 1503 n.4; United States v. Doe, 934 F.2d 353, 358 (D.C. Cir. 1991); 
United States v. La Guardia, 902 F.2d 1010, 1015-16 (1st Cir. 1990). 
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substantial assistance motion. Accordingly, I would not 
adopt the Imtiaz approach. 
 
III. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the district 
court's order in its entirety. 
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